Organizational strategies in the context of legitimacy loss: Radical versus gradual responses to disclosed corruption by Schembera, Stefan & Scherer, Andreas
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2017
Organizational strategies in the context of legitimacy loss: Radical versus
gradual responses to disclosed corruption
Schembera, Stefan; Scherer, Andreas
Abstract: How do organizations respond to the loss of legitimacy in the context of disclosed corruption,
and what drives the particular responses adopted? In this article, we study the organizational strategies
of three multinational companies before, during, and after legitimacy loss due to disclosed organizational
corruption. We explore why some multinational companies exceed regulatory expectations and choose
radical strategies that substantially influence their environment by defining a new benchmark of anti-
corruption practices, while others follow a more gradual approach. We build on the concept of legitimacy
in institutional theory and focus on three strategies that organizations tend to adopt to regain legitimacy:
isomorphic adaptation, moral reasoning, and strategic manipulation. Based on our empirical study, we
suggest that when a transgression is accompanied by a strong legitimacy shock, transgressors are likely to
see no alternative but to react both radically and instantly. We identify two distinct extremes of strategic
manipulation: decoupling and substantial influence.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127016685237
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-173197
Journal Article
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Schembera, Stefan; Scherer, Andreas (2017). Organizational strategies in the context of legitimacy loss:
Radical versus gradual responses to disclosed corruption. Strategic Organization, 15(3):301-337.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127016685237
 ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGITIMACY LOSS: 
RADICAL VERSUS GRADUAL RESPONSES TO DISCLOSED CORRUPTION 
 
Stefan Schembera 
stefan.schembera@business.uzh.ch 
 
Andreas Georg Scherer 
andreas.scherer@business.uzh.ch 
 
University of Zurich 
Department of Business Administration 
Universitätsstr. 84, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland 
Tel.: +41 44 634 53 09 
Fax: +41 44 634 53 01 
 
Zurich, November 29, 2016 
 
Unedited version of a paper published in Strategic Organization, Online First, 2017,  
DOI: 10.1177/1476127016685237. 
 
For private use only. For correct citations and quotations please see the original publication 
in Strategic Organization, available at journals.sagepub.com/home/soq 
 
Acknowledgements: 
The authors acknowledge the financial support of this study by the SNF Swiss National Sci-
ence Foundation for the project ‘Organizing for Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(100014_137789). The authors thank the representatives of the involved companies for their 
willingness to take part in our interviews. We acknowledge the support of Pascal Raeber, 
Martin Schiller and Ivona Topalovic in transcribing and analyzing the interview material. Pat-
rick Haack, Christian Voegtlin, Peter Fleming and Mike Pfarrer have provided very construc-
tive feedback on previous versions of the paper. 
  
 
 
1 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGITIMACY LOSS: 
RADICAL VERSUS GRADUAL RESPONSES TO DISCLOSED CORRUPTION 
 
Abstract 
How do organizations respond to the loss of legitimacy in the context of disclosed corruption, 
and what drives the particular responses adopted? In this paper, we study the organizational 
strategies of three multinational companies (MNCs) before, during and after legitimacy loss 
due to disclosed organizational corruption. We explore why some MNCs exceed regulatory 
expectations and choose radical strategies that substantially influence their environment by 
defining a new benchmark of anti-corruption practices, while others follow a more gradual 
approach. We build on the concept of legitimacy in institutional theory and focus on three 
strategies that organizations tend to adopt to regain legitimacy: isomorphic adaptation, moral 
reasoning and strategic manipulation. Based on our empirical study, we suggest that when a 
transgression is accompanied by a strong legitimacy shock, transgressors are likely to see no 
alternative but to react both radically and instantly. We identify two distinct extremes of stra-
tegic manipulation: decoupling and substantial influence. 
Keywords  
Corporate social responsibility, corruption, institutional environment, organizational response, 
legitimacy, reintegration, transgression 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on organizational corruption has focused mainly on the antecedents of this phenom-
enon (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Simpson, 2002; Staw and 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Sutherland, 1949). More recently, scholars have started to examine how 
organizations respond after the disclosure of corruption (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Bertels et al., 
2014). In particular, Pfarrer et al. (2008) provide valuable insights into how corrupt organiza-
tions can become ‘reintegrated’ after the disclosure of corruption. Reintegration is defined as 
a process by which organizations repair their relationships with key internal and external 
stakeholders when these have been damaged by acts of wrongdoing (Goodstein et al., 2014). 
Pfarrer et al. (2008) conceptualize a four-stage reintegration process and argue that passing 
through these stages (discovery, explanation, penance, rehabilitation) successfully may in-
crease the speed and likelihood of reintegration. 
While we acknowledge the contribution of Pfarrer et al. (2008), their normative model is lim-
ited to outlining what an ideal process of reintegration should look like, rather than describing 
what actually happens or explaining variations across transgression cases. Second, the authors 
look at stakeholder-driven processes and focus primarily on the communicative responses to 
stakeholder demands, and thereby neglect more firm-driven strategies and observable organi-
zational changes regarding transgression controls. Bertels et al. (2014) empirical study of re-
integration avoids the normative stance and achieves a more in-depth scrutiny of organiza-
tional actions, yet only focuses on stakeholders associated with the legal system. In addition, 
both of these reintegration models focus on rational reintegration processes at the expense of 
responses driven by emotions like shame or embarrassment. 
The quest for legitimacy is commonly identified as a key driver for organizations to respond 
to demands from within their environment and to become reintegrated (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Legitimacy, i.e., the social ac-
  
 
 
3 
ceptance of business organizations and their activities, is based on a “generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 
1995: 574). A lack of legitimacy impedes an organization’s access to resources and support 
from important constituents (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Institutional theorists have discussed 
a range of response strategies to manage legitimacy demands (Scherer et al., 2013; Oliver, 
1991; Suchman, 1995). Although previous literature acknowledges that transgressions, crises 
and routine failures lead to concerns about legitimacy (see, e.g., Scherer et al., 2013: 262; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990), we need to know more about how and 
why transgressions induce organizations to adopt legitimacy strategies over time (see Pfarrer 
et al., 2008: , as problematized above). 
We therefore focus on legitimacy strategies that aim both to restore organizational legitimacy 
after involvement in corruption cases and facilitate reintegration with the institutional envi-
ronment (or with multiple stakeholders, see Sethi, 1979; Shapiro, 1991; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
In particular, we focus on MNCs as a prototype of large and powerful organizations facing 
exceptional challenges in the selection of adequate response strategies due to the multitude of 
demands across various institutional environments. Understanding this process is not only 
crucial for further developing theory as outlined above, but also matters to practitioners: Cor-
ruption is still endemic in MNCs despite the fact that many MNCs have formulated anti-
corruption policies and parts of the institutional environment have given priority to the fight 
against corruption over the last few decades. For example, Siemens had established anti-
corruption policies and was already a member of Transparency International (TI) and the UN 
Global Compact (UNGC) before the disclosure of widespread organizational corruption in 
2006 to 2008 (Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011; OECD, 2012; GibsonDunn, 2013). After the 
disclosure, however, it became evident that the company policies had not been sufficiently 
embedded within organizational structures and processes. In view of the above, the main re-
  
 
 
4 
search questions underlying this study are: How and why do organizations respond to the loss 
of legitimacy in the context of disclosed corruption? 
Our purpose is to contribute to the literatures on organizational corruption and on organiza-
tional responses to legitimacy crises of multinational companies. In particular, we aim not on-
ly to theorize about the commonalities in organizational responses to transgressions but also 
to better understand the factors that explain variance. Our goal is hence twofold: 1) to identify 
and theorize a common set of legitimacy strategies in the context of transgressions, and 2) to 
describe and explain the variance in temporality, sequence and extent of transgressions and 
organizational responses. Consequently, we generate our theory inductively and apply a lon-
gitudinal comparative case-study design focusing on three MNCs – ABB Ltd., Daimler AG 
and Siemens AG – engaged in cases of transnational corruption in the recent past.  
We find extensive commonalities in the legitimacy strategies of our case firms, especially be-
fore and after the disclosed transgression. However, we also find substantial variance during 
the transgression disclosure with regard to the timing, sequence and extent of legitimacy strat-
egies due to specific combinations of transgression and reintegration process characteristics. 
Based on these findings, we first theorize on the commonly observed shift from ‘decoupling’ 
to what we call a ‘substantial influence’ strategy, i.e., radically developing and implementing 
internal corruption controls, as well as promoting new practices externally as a benchmark in 
the field. Second, we explain why in cases of legitimacy shock and strong emotional in-
volvement, the transgressor tends to focus directly on ‘substantial influence’ to regain legiti-
macy. In the absence of a shock, we suggest that elements of ‘decoupling’ may initially per-
sist, and reintegration tends to follow a gradual process as suggested by existing models 
(Pfarrer et al., 2008; Bertels et al., 2014); repeated regulatory pressure appears necessary to 
trigger substantial organizational changes and elements of a ‘substantial influence’ strategy. 
Third, we argue that it is necessary to distinguish two variants of ‘strategically manipulating’ 
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the institutional environment: (1) ‘decoupling’ from and (2) ‘substantially influencing’ institu-
tional demands. Such demands may, for example, stem from regulatory authorities, business 
partners, government officials or societal groups. Finally, we discuss the implications of ap-
plying multiple versus single strategies in regaining legitimacy. 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSGRESSIONS, 
CORRUPTION CONTROLS AND LEGITIMACY STRATEGIES 
Organizational corruption and changes in the institutional environment 
Corruption can be generally defined as the ‘misuse of an organizational position or authority 
for personal gain or organizational (or sub-unit) gain’ (Anand et al., 2004: 40). In line with 
existing studies on corruption from the institutional theory perspective (Misangyi et al., 2008; 
Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011), we refer to ‘misuse’ not only as deviations from regulatory 
norms, but also deviations from accepted social norms and/or cognitive elements. We focus 
on systemic corruption at the level of the organization (see Ashforth et al., 2008: 673) and re-
strict our analysis to transnational cases of corruption illustrating the heterogeneous demands 
modern organizations face. 
Regulatory sanctions for transnational corruption are a recent phenomenon. For a long time, 
existing legislation on, e.g., cases of bribery extending beyond national borders was rarely en-
forced (GibsonDunn, 2013; Weismann et al., 2014). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) (passed in 1977 and amended in 1988), a US law forbidding bribery of foreign public 
officials and requiring anti-corruption accounting rules for firms listed at the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), has been in existence for more than three decades. However, the US Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have only re-
cently started to enforce it extensively (GibsonDunn, 2013). There are currently at least 78 
corporations under investigation for possible FCPA violations and a total of $3.74 billion has 
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been paid by 58 companies to settle corruption charges (Wayne, 2012). In the meantime many 
other countries have enacted similar laws (Nichols, 2012: 362). 
Besides regulatory changes, the fight against corruption also involves normative and cultural-
cognitive changes. Various international organizations such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) have established inter-
national conventions (e.g., the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials or the UN Convention against Corruption) that promote transnational anti-corruption 
norms without, however, being legally enforceable as such. Similarly, multi-stakeholder initi-
atives (e.g., the UNGC or the World Economic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initia-
tive) and non-governmental organizations such as TI provide guidance on the fight against 
corruption (for overviews of changes in the institutional environment to fight corruption, see: 
Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011; Hess, 2012). Despite these developments, however, there is 
no ‘shortage’ of corruption related transgressions involving MNCs. 
Disclosed transgressions and organizational responses 
A transgression generally refers to an unethical act such as corruption that places its stake-
holders at risk (Coombs, 1995). We look at – disclosed – corrupt behavior as one particular 
type of an unethical act, or transgression (see also Pfarrer et al., 2008). Pfarrer et al. (2008) 
conceptualize a four-stage reintegration process and argue that passing through these stages 
successfully may increase the speed and likelihood of reintegration. A stage is passed when 
stakeholders concur about 1) what happened (discovery), 2) why it happened (explanation), 3) 
what punishment is appropriate (penance), and 4) what organizational changes have been im-
plemented to prevent future misconduct. Bertels et al. (2014) build on these four stages using 
a single-case study approach. As these two models apply a legitimacy approach in looking at 
organizational reintegration, they appear particularly relevant for our study. In contrast, other 
models of reintegration focus, for example, on trust (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et 
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al., 2014), restorative justice (Goodstein and Butterfield, 2010) or the micro level of analysis 
(Gromet and Okimoto, 2014). Further knowledge about organizational responses in the con-
text of legitimacy loss seems necessary for the following reasons.  
First, the model of Pfarrer et al. (2008) focuses on an ideal process of reintegration and is ex-
plicitly normative. It assumes that transgression responses can be separated into distinct stag-
es that can be passed through in a certain linear sequence (Pfarrer et al., 2008: 740). In con-
trast, the model falls short when it comes to explaining deviations from the ideal, such as var-
ying temporalities, sequences and extents of transgressions and organizational responses that 
can be observed in in-depth case studies. In today’s globalized world with organizations fac-
ing varying jurisdictions, stakeholder demands and interests one may wonder whether one re-
integration stage is typically fully completed before progressing to the next. For example, for 
an MNC with offices around the world, disclosed bribery may induce several countries and 
jurisdictions to investigate the transgressor at different points in time. Hence, transgression re-
sponse stages such as ‘discovery’ and ‘penance’ may occur in alternating waves or cycles ra-
ther than in a linear order. Furthermore, the transgressor may implement, e.g., monitoring and 
due diligence processes that fall under the last ‘rehabilitation’ stage, which may then trigger 
further ‘discovery’. Hence, it even seems unlikely that certain reintegration stages can be 
completed at all, e.g., that all facts of a transgression can be ‘discovered’ or the transgressor 
can be fully ‘rehabilitated’ vis-à-vis all involved stakeholder groups. While Pfarrer et al. 
(2008) briefly refer to timing as a moderator in the transgression response process, we need to 
know more about how and why temporalities vary across cases. 
Second, Pfarrer et al. (2008) look at reintegration as a process that is primarily, if not exclu-
sively, stakeholder-driven. The authors expect firms to respond in full accordance with the 
stakeholder demands and assume that concurrence among stakeholders, e.g., about the trans-
gression and its key elements, is likely (Pfarrer et al., 2008: 736). In contrast, they neglect the 
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possibility of more firm-driven actions in, for example, cases when firms act proactively or 
respond deliberatively to heterogeneous stakeholder demands. While Bertels et al. (2014) 
avoid the normative stance in their reintegration model and consider in greater depth demon-
strated firm actions, they restrict their analysis to the role of only one particular type of stake-
holder – governments (i.e., regulators, prosecutors, and courts) – in supporting organizational 
reintegration efforts. Consequently, they only look at regulatory (civil and criminal) sanctions 
leaving mostly unaddressed the role of social sanctions as defined above.  
Third, both reintegration models presented above focus on rational reintegration processes 
based on economic calculations (e.g. Hart, 1995). Business firms may calculate ex ante the 
control costs of compliance (including opportunity costs for loss of orders or delayed busi-
nesses due to anti-corruption policies) on the one hand and costs of noncompliance (including 
anticipated sanctions for disclosed transgressions and legitimacy loss) on the other. After a 
transgression, Western enforcement agencies such as the SEC and DOJ (in the US) play a key 
role in enforcing anti-corruption regulations, and impose severe monetary sanctions and com-
pliance costs on transgressors. For example, enforcing the FCPA often entails out-of-court 
settlements with US authorities (Schwarz, 2011). The Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(DPAs), a proceeding that is closed only after the successful completion of the agreed terms, 
is a popular arrangement in such a settlement (see e.g. Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011; 
Schwarz, 2011; Bertels et al., 2014). Based on the same economic calculation, however, ra-
tional transgressors may still be tempted to avoid implementation costs by introducing only 
gradual changes. Beyond such rational responses, Pfarrer et al. (2008: 739) only occasionally 
include references to emotions such as shame. If they do so, they focus on ‘shaming’ from the 
stakeholder perspective, rather than discussing the organizational response of ‘feeling shame’. 
Similarly, Bertels et al. (2014: 355) mention only once that transgressors “would be very em-
barrassed”, without outlining the organizational response to such emotions. 
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In line with institutional theory (see Scherer et al., 2013; Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood 
et al., 2011), not only expected sanctions and compliance costs, but also the consistency of 
societal (anti-) corruption expectations is likely to influence organizational response. For ex-
ample, Western anti-corruption and compliance demands may become more urgent for a 
transgressor than bribery demands by a public official in a developing country. Lange (2008) 
distinguishes two major types of sanctions in the context of a transgression, which we draw 
on in this paper: regulatory sanctions on the one hand, and social sanctions on the other. Reg-
ulatory sanctions include, for example, the disgorgement and penalty payments listed in the 
settlement agreements plus other legal expenses, e.g., for lawsuits, lawyers or consultants. In 
contrast, social sanctions primarily refer to the extent of negative press coverage that trans-
gressors receive in the course of disclosure, settlement, and reintegration. 
Legitimacy strategies in anti-corruption environments 
From an institutional point of view, MNCs seek to portray themselves as legitimate actors by 
incorporating institutional elements of internal and external origin (Kostova et al., 2008). 
When an organization’s actual operations and institutional expectations are mismatched, the 
organization needs to adapt to the perceptions of its constituents. Incorporating global institu-
tional demands relating to anti-corruption, however, poses serious challenges to MNCs: while 
the enforcement of legislation against transnational corruption originates mainly in developed 
Western countries, many developing countries in which MNCs operate still present a high 
corruption risk (TI, 2012). Consequently, MNCs can easily become involved in corrupt prac-
tices along their supply chains, thus diminishing a corporation’s legitimacy. 
Scholars have distinguished three broadly defined types of legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995). 
(1) Pragmatic legitimacy “rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most 
immediate audiences” (Suchman, 1995: 578). It can be maintained or regained when the most 
important constituents expect to benefit from the organization. (2) Moral legitimacy is based 
  
 
 
10 
on normative evaluations of the organization and is granted if the organization’s behavior is 
considered the ‘right thing to do’ (see also Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). (3) Cognitive legitimacy, 
in turn, is distinct from evaluation in that it refers to the “mere acceptance of the organization 
as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cultural account“ (Suchman, 
1995: 582). How organizational responses to legitimacy loss shift over time and why such re-
sponses may differ across organizations, depending on which types of legitimacy are threat-
ened, remains largely unaddressed (see Pfarrer et al., 2008; Bertels et al., 2014). 
Rather than referring to reintegration stages (Pfarrer et al., 2008), we decided to focus on le-
gitimacy strategies, considering that the latter come with the advantage of not prescribing a 
distinct and linear sequence of application. Scholars have identified several types of legitima-
cy strategies; our initial analysis was guided by the following typology, developed for sus-
tainability issues in complex institutional environments (Scherer et al., 2013): isomorphic ad-
aptation, moral reasoning and strategic manipulation (see also: Driscoll, 2006; Oliver, 1991; 
Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995). By using an isomorphic adaptation strategy, the organization 
adapts its organizational practices to social expectations – e.g., an MNC may choose to report 
more extensively on corruption in its annual reports if it perceives that this is an emerging 
practice in its industry or the country in which it operates. By using a moral reasoning strate-
gy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013), organizations may enter into a discourse 
with focal stakeholders and societal groups about the acceptability of the organization’s status 
quo and behavior. For example, discussing with peers ideas on how to fight corruption in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives like the UNGC can be part of a moral reasoning strategy. 
Third, companies may use a strategic manipulation strategy, which involves influencing how 
its constituents perceive the way in which the organization appears to benefit them (Scherer et 
al., 2013; Oliver, 1991). The key instruments associated with manipulation strategies are stra-
tegic public relations and impression management tactics that involve advertising campaigns, 
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dissemination of (misleading) information or lobbying (Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; 
Fombrun, 2001). Arguing that organizations that use a manipulation strategy do not change 
the practices criticized by some of their stakeholders, scholars highlight the parallels of this 
strategy with the concept of decoupling (Scherer et al., 2013: 266) (see also Palazzo and 
Richter, 2005; Weaver et al., 1999). ‘Decoupling’ refers to a gap between formal structures 
and actual practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The application of decoupling as a strategy to 
respond to conflicting institutional demands assumes that organizational structures and activi-
ties can be protected from evaluation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 357). The recent wave of dis-
closed corruption at MNCs involving large-scale investigations (Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 
2011) suggests that protection from evaluation is not always possible. 
Relating legitimacy strategies to corruption control types 
To be able to determine which legitimacy strategy a firm applies, we need to identify and cat-
egorize organizational practices in the context of corruption. The following literature proved 
helpful in this regard. Lange (2008) recently merged two streams of literature – one on organ-
izational and the other on corruption control – to conceptualize an ‘Organizational Corruption 
Control Circumplex’ (OCC). Therein, he distinguishes social/cultural controls from adminis-
trative controls (see left column of Table 1). ‘Controls’ in this context refer to organizational 
mechanisms to fight corruption. While the former type of controls are transmitted by values 
and norms in organizations, the latter type focuses on formal structures and processes. Re-
garding legitimacy strategies, we may roughly associate a focus on administrative controls 
with an ‘isomorphic adaptation’ strategy, and a focus on social/cultural as well as interactive 
controls with a ‘moral reasoning’ strategy. If, however, a company implements only a frac-
tional set of administrative controls without any elements of social/cultural controls, a ‘de-
coupling’ strategy seems likely to be at play (see Scherer et al., 2013). 
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In addition, given that our paper deals with corruption cases that included settlements with the 
SEC, we also considered the guidelines for ‘Effective Compliance and Ethics Program[s]’ of 
the US Sentencing Commission (USSC, 2010: , §8B2.1.) and categorized them into so-
cial/cultural versus administrative controls (Lange, 2008). Finally, as we shall explain later, 
our empirical analysis revealed the need to further consider an interactive and/or voluntary 
type of organizational measure, e.g., as depicted in the corporate citizenship assessment mod-
el (CC) by Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013). This type captures corruption controls that go 
beyond the elements of the previous two frameworks and focus on collaborative efforts of or-
ganizations with the intent to change anti-corruption practices not only within the organiza-
tion but also in its institutional environment. As such, this type proved necessary to fully cap-
ture the organizational practices in the context of a ‘substantial influence’ strategy that 
emerged from our analysis. Table 1 displays the synthesis of corruption controls resulting 
from the three presented frameworks and relates those controls to legitimacy strategies (left 
part of Table 1). Depicting the three types of organizational corruption controls in the left col-
umn, we list key organizational corruption control elements of each type in the middle col-
umn; the original literature and practitioner sources (OCC, USSCG, CC) are listed as bullets 
beneath each element. Note that Pfarrer et al. (2008) barely discuss actual organizational cor-
ruption controls, except for single examples in the rehabilitation stage, which we also refer-
enced in Table 1. 
---------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------------------------------- 
To sum up, institutional theory scholars have acknowledged that legitimacy concerns arise 
particularly when routines fail and a transgression or crisis occurs (Scherer et al., 2013: 262; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). However, how such events trigger par-
ticular legitimacy strategies in the context of a transgression over time remains largely un-
addressed (Pfarrer et al., 2008). Our aim is, hence, to close this gap by exploring how distinct 
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elements of transgressions influence the dynamics, sequence and combination of organiza-
tional strategies in the context of legitimacy loss and which factors play a crucial role along 
the reintegration process. Having shed light on these questions, we will theorize a generalized 
process model of organizational strategies in the context of legitimacy loss. 
METHODS 
Research design and sampling 
We applied a multiple dynamic case design to compare and interpret our findings, which cov-
er the period 2012–2014, across our target firms (Yin, 1984), as well as over time and space 
(Gerring, 2007), and aggregated data where appropriate. In selecting our sample, we followed 
the sampling approach (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998) of choosing ‘extreme’ cases wherein 
the phenomenon of interest (here, the disclosed corruption transgression) is ‘transparently ob-
servable’. On the basis of our sampling approach, we selected the following companies: Sie-
mens AG (Siemens), Daimler AG (Daimler) and Asea Brown Bovery Ltd (ABB). In all cases 
we were able to interview firm representatives towards the end of the regulatory proceedings 
(the period in which the transgressors operate under the DPA or a similar settlement with pub-
lic authorities, as defined above) and after the termination of these regulatory obligations. 
We selected cases of MNCs implicated in recent transnational transgressions, which differed 
in key aspects, most notably concerning subsequent regulatory and social sanctions. Our as-
sumption was that the analysis of different transgressions of multiple case firms would enable 
us to develop theory about the reintegration process with regard to the sequence, combination 
and extent of applied legitimacy strategies of large, prominent and powerful organizations 
facing heterogeneous expectations in their environment (see Doz, 1996; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
At the same time, we aimed to control for factors that are unrelated to the transgression char-
acteristics: We focused on firms from the high technology manufacturing sector, generally 
known to face moderate to high corruption risks (TI, 2011). Furthermore, we chose only 
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MNCs headquartered in Switzerland or Germany. Both countries are perceived to have simi-
larly low corruption risks (TI, 2012), have similarly strict anti-corruption legislation and are at 
an advanced stage of implementing anti-corruption measures that derive from the OECD 
Convention Against Corruption (see OECD, 2012). To gain a more global perspective on the 
corruption phenomenon, we expanded our data collection to several other countries. We fo-
cused on Asia-Pacific, as this region includes several high corruption-risk countries that have 
been involved in the corruption schemes of our transgressors (see TI, 2012). Furthermore, this 
region allows for smooth data access thanks to infrastructure and use of English language. 
Case context 
Siemens is among the leading technology companies worldwide, headquartered in Munich 
and Berlin, Germany, and operating with four sectors (energy, industry, infrastructure & cit-
ies, and healthcare – until a slight restructuring in September 30, 2014) in more than 190 
countries (Siemens, 2013). Siemens has a total of around 370,000 employees and its annual 
turnover generally exceeds €80 billion (Siemens, 2015). According to the SEC’s complaint, 
“between March 12, 2001, and September 30, 2007, Siemens created elaborate payment 
schemes to conceal the nature of its corrupt payments, and the company’s inadequate internal 
controls allowed the conduct to flourish” (SEC, 2008b). Infractions covered various sectors 
and projects including, for example, metro transit lines in Venezuela, power plants in Israel, 
refineries in Mexico, mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh or medical devices in Vi-
etnam, China and Russia (for a detailed list, see SEC, 2008a: 13-32). Siemens paid “more 
than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, 
and the Americas [and] the pattern of bribery […] was unprecedented in scale and geographic 
reach” (SEC, 2008b). The SEC complaint further specifies that the MNC used third parties to 
obscure the purpose for, and the ultimate recipient of, thousands of cash payments, which 
employees sometimes transported in suitcases across international borders. Like the transgres-
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sion itself, also the institutional sanctions for Siemens were unprecedented. Table 2 provides a 
comparative overview of regulatory and social sanctions at our case firms. 
------------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------- 
Daimler is a multinational automotive corporation with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, 
and locations on every continent; it focuses on Europe, Asia and North America. The compa-
ny has five divisions, of which the two most important are Mercedes-Benz Cars and Daimler 
Trucks (Daimler, 2013). Daimler’s annual turnover of over €100 billion (Daimler, 2013) ex-
ceeds that of Siemens, although the company has fewer employees (around 275,000) and op-
erates in fewer countries. According to the SEC, “Daimler paid at least $56 million in im-
proper payments over a period of more than 10 years. The payments involved more than 200 
transactions in at least 22 countries. Daimler earned $1.9 billion in revenue and at least $90 
million in illegal profits through these tainted sales transactions, which involved at least 6,300 
commercial vehicles and 500 passenger cars” (SEC, 2010b). Table 2 outlines the high regula-
tory and rather moderate social sanctions Daimler faced. 
ABB is one of the leading firms worldwide in energy and automation technologies. The com-
pany has its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland, and operates in more than 100 countries 
(ABB, 2013). ABB has around 146,000 employees and an annual turnover of around $40 bil-
lion (ABB, 2013). On September 29, 2010, the SEC charged “ABB Ltd with violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for using subsidiaries to pay bribes to Mexican offi-
cials to obtain business with government-owned power companies, and to pay kickbacks to 
Iraq to obtain contracts under the U.N. Oil for Food Program” (SEC, 2010a). According to the 
SEC “ABB’s subsidiaries made at least $2.7 million in illicit payments [...] to obtain contracts 
that generated more than $100 million in revenues for ABB” (SEC, 2010a). ABB faced lower 
regulatory and social sanctions compared to Siemens and Daimler as noted in Table 2. 
Data collection and analysis 
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Following established guidelines (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we analyzed our data during the 
collection process. To reduce biases wherever possible, we use interview as well as documen-
tary data, both of which we triangulated by incorporating various perspectives (Flick, 1992; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) as summarized in Table 3. We conducted 40 interviews with representa-
tives of the case firms and third parties like lawyers, judges, auditors, NGOs and officials in 
the MNC headquarter and Asia-Pacific region. Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 90 
minutes and were transcribed. We selected respondents initially based on their expertise 
and/or direct involvement in the reintegration process, and later added informants recom-
mended during previous interviews. In addition we analyzed 54 company (annual and/or sus-
tainability) reports, policies and codes of conduct, 16 documents relating to regulatory and 
criminal proceedings provided by the SEC, the DOJ and the World Bank, as well as 207 press 
articles on our case firms provided by RepRisk AG (RepRisk, 2013) and other media. Table 3 
lists the number of documents per type of source for each company. Given that our interview 
data spans three years (2012-2014), including repeated interviews with several actors, and our 
documentary data even covers the period from 2003 to 2014, we have been able to analyze the 
organizational situation before, during and after the respective corruption transgressions. 
------------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------- 
At the beginning of our analysis, in 2012, we considered a variety of documentary sources 
(Yin, 1984), ranging from regulatory proceedings related to the FCPA to company reports and 
media reports, to form a picture of the corruption. On this basis, we developed the guideline 
for the first interviews at the companies’ headquarters, focusing on what characterized each 
transgression and on the initial reactions of the transgressors. As regulatory proceedings came 
to an end in the course of 2013, we gained further insights into the organizational processes of 
responding to legitimacy loss and observed corporate actions in ‘real time’. Such ‘real time’ 
changes (e.g., in key personnel or the organizational structures) were addressed in subsequent 
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interviews. We also drew on these first interviews and documentary data to conduct the first 
round of open coding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
In the next step, we turned to academic literature to relate our data to theoretical concepts and 
frameworks. To develop our data structure, we adhered to recommendations for building 
grounded theory on the basis of a two-order code scheme (Gioia et al., 2013; Corley and 
Gioia, 2004; Ravasi and Phillips, 2011). According to this approach, first-order codes reflect 
as closely as possible the language used by the informant. In contrast, second-order codes are 
mainly based on the analysis and synthesis of first-order codes. For example, the repeated 
first-order references to a ‘no choice’ and ‘strong emotional shift’ situation (at Siemens) or 
(FCPA) monitor ‘pressure’ and ‘intensity’ (at Daimler) helped us identify dominant second-
order themes like ‘legitimacy shock’ or ‘external enforcement pressure’ that we incorporated 
in our emerging data structure. Third, we discussed possible relationships among the themes 
that had emerged. This process relates to axial coding techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between first and second-order codes as well as the overarch-
ing themes that we subsequently synthesized. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------- 
These data structuring procedures together with continuous discussions between the authors 
about reconfigurations of codings are expected to “lend the requisite rigor to the analyses” 
(Gioia et al., 2013: 22). Additionally, we took into account independent codings of selected 
data by student assistants, and discussed the emerging themes together with our interpreta-
tions in follow-up interviews with respondents from the case firms and incorporated their 
feedback (see Corbin and Strauss, 1990: 11). Our motivation for this step was to test our con-
fidence in our findings and interpretations (see Gioia et al., 2013: 22). 
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FINDINGS 
We now present the themes and codes of our three cases using representative excerpts from 
interview and documentary data. These findings informed our process model on organization-
al strategies in the context of legitimacy loss shown in Figure 2. In order to facilitate the un-
derstanding of the case narratives, we here provide a brief overview of the model’s elements. 
We then structure our findings in two parts. In a first section, the focus is on the commonali-
ties of the model. The presentation of individual case-based narratives explaining variance in 
the chronology and speed of strategy shifts then follows in a second step. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ------------------------------- 
The process model illustrated in Figure 2 integrates the themes and codes of Figure 1 by put-
ting them in a dynamic context. Regarding commonalities across cases, we found a similar 
typology of legitimacy strategies at our case firms before and after the disclosed transgression 
respectively. Having perceived rising challenges in their institutional environments, firms fo-
cused on a decoupling strategy before the transgression was disclosed. They applied elements 
of isomorphic adaptation and moral reasoning only to a lesser extent (see two boxes and ar-
row on the left). The focus on decoupling led to the disclosure of corruption (arrow: trans-
gression disclosure). The transgressors lost legitimacy resulting from this disclosure, which 
led to a strategy shift in the course of the transgression (large central box). However, and cru-
cially, we found that emotional involvement (even to the point of consternation) in the context 
of legitimacy loss was key to triggering a substantial and sustainable strategy change. After 
the transgression, ‘substantial influence’ replaced ‘decoupling’ in the set of post-transgression 
legitimacy strategies; moral reasoning and isomorphic adaptation continued (right box). 
Beyond such commonalities across cases, we find also substantial variance with regard to the 
timing, sequence and extent to which the transgressors applied and shifted legitimacy strate-
gies during the transgression (large central box). Three key distinct themes emerged from our 
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transgressors’ corruption cases that help explain such differences: (1) a ‘legitimacy shock’ 
(top element of the legitimacy loss box) triggered by a particular ‘way’ of transgression dis-
closure, (2) external enforcement pressure, and (3) previous sanctions. As we identified that 
Siemens was primarily affected by the first, Daimler by the second, and ABB by the third 
theme, we structure our case findings along these three narratives. Each of these case narra-
tives is accompanied by an individual process timeline (Figures 3a-c) illustrating the varying 
chronology, speed and intensity of applied legitimacy strategies described below (see 
Langley, 1999). Finally, Table 4 depicts a selection of representative quotations from our in-
terview and documentary data about the processes described here. 
Strategic shift toward substantial influence in the context of legitimacy loss 
Before highlighting the individual case narratives, we now focus on the commonly observed 
strategic shift toward ‘substantial influence’ after disclosed corruption. This post-
transgression strategy emerged inductively from our data and is composed of the two codes 
‘we do more than we have to’ and ‘we want to make sure everybody else does so too’. 
‘We do more than we have to’. After the disclosure of corruption at Siemens, the statement of 
the new CEO Löscher in a 2007 speech “only clean business is Siemens business – every-
where, everybody, every time” (Moosmayer and Winter, 2011: ,  p. 4) was unequivocally 
clear and complemented by comprehensive anti-corruption training and whistle-blowing pro-
cedures. Besides these social/cultural corruption controls, respondents like the lawyer at Gib-
son Dunn outlined that Siemens implemented a comprehensive set of administrative controls, 
including voluntary measures such as a strictly centralized structure of value flows and ap-
proval processes, a bonus-malus system to align incentives, and specialized audits in addition 
to general tasks by the audit department (see also Graeff et al., 2009; Gebhardt and Müller-
Seitz, 2011). The Siemens FCPA monitor confirmed that “Siemens has done more than what 
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regulators both in the US and Germany expected”, a judgment supported by various respond-
ents (see Table 4). 
------------------------------- Insert Table 4 about here ------------------------------- 
The conclusion of Daimler’s FCPA monitor resembles the one at Siemens: “Daimler AG’s 
management has in many respects done more than required in a settlement with U.S. institu-
tions (…) Daimler really wants to become world champion in compliance” (see Newswires, 
2012). Furthermore, our respondent at the law firm Gibson Dunn mentions that “Daimler, like 
Siemens, has included voluntarily questions on pressure to perform in anonymous question-
naires”. Even before Siemens and Daimler, ABB installed a set of leading innovative corrup-
tion controls, especially social/cultural ones. After its first transgression, ABB displayed the 
largest scope of anti-corruption reporting among case firms, including a clear zero-tolerance 
statement, information on training, and the installation of a whistle-blowing procedure. In 
sum, we observed several instances among our case firms of aiming to ‘over-fulfilling’ the 
requirements imposed on them by single constituents. 
‘We want to make sure everybody else does so too’. In addition, transgressors introduced in-
teractive corruption controls. Siemens launched the Collective Action program that emerged 
in the context of the 2009 agreement with the World Bank Group, wherein Siemens agreed to 
co-operate to change industry practices and engage in collective actions to fight fraud and cor-
ruption (WBG, 2009). As our document analysis clearly shows, the company’s collective ac-
tion activities go well beyond the terms of the World Bank agreement. Not only the title of the 
program “How we can drive Collective Action” (Meyer and Waldschmidt, 2012: 22), but also 
multiple external parties indicate that the company’s approach is strongly proactive and firm-
driven rather than passive and stakeholder-driven. This proactive approach relates to another 
central 1st order code (see Table 4: ‘we want to make sure everybody else does so too’) as il-
lustrated by the following quote: “[O]ne of our goals is to transport our knowledge and expe-
rience towards the outside, make it available to others and build alliances with other market 
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participants, simply to work together on fair competition” (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012). 
Beyond the World Bank agreement, Siemens promoted its new anti-corruption practices, e.g., 
at international industry, government and NGO meetings (“… every quarter we have what we 
call a best practice session. Siemens did one in September last year.” TI Malaysia, Apr. 2014) 
and engages in collaborations with academia. As UNGC LEAD member and repeated speaker 
at international anti-corruption events, Daimler also displayed efforts to promote its standards 
beyond organizational boundaries. ABB, although temporarily, participated in the largest 
number of voluntary initiatives (PACI, TI, UNGC) compared to the other case firms. While 
we did not find clear evidence whether ABB proactively tried to diffuse its controls, some of 
ABB’s practices (training, whistle-blowing) became established thereafter. 
Strategy shifts and differences in the chronology, speed and intensity of strategies 
Siemens’s legitimacy shock and radical response 
In the period prior to the disclosed transgression at Siemens in 2006 (tpre), Siemens had al-
ready installed bureaucratic controls consisting of formal rules, codes and policies to fight 
corruption. Siemens also displayed certain elements of interactive corruption controls, e.g., by 
becoming member of TI Germany in 1998 “after the Siemens-management had campaigned 
for the implementation of the OECD convention” (TI Germany, Dec. 2006) and participating 
in the UNGC since 2003. However, corruption controls aiming at translating these formal pol-
icies and structures into daily practices (e.g., through leadership support, training, a com-
plaints procedure or monitoring) were either rudimentary or lacking: “From 1999 to 2003 (…) 
the Vorstand was ineffective in implementing controls to address constraints imposed by 
Germany's 1999 adoption of the [OECD] anti-bribery convention that outlawed foreign brib-
ery.” (SEC, 2008a: 5). A Siemens Senior CO added in our Nov. 2012 interview that “it was 
simply lacking awareness for these issues (…) and for consequent action when formalities 
were not met”. Given such gaps between policies and practices, Siemens was clearly follow-
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ing a ‘decoupling’ strategy in tpre. This strategy continued even after the firm’s NYSE listing 
in 2001 and indications of systemic bribery leading to a settlement with Italian authorities in 
2004. Neglecting rising institutional demands and warning signs then led to the transgression. 
The transgression disclosure period at Siemens (ttrans) primarily started with the massive raid 
at the company HQ in Nov. 2006. As summarized in Table 2, this raid resulted in unprece-
dented regulatory and social sanctions at Siemens (see also Figure 3a), and put the organiza-
tion in a state of shock. 
Legitimacy shock. Interviewees at Siemens described that Siemens employees used to read 
with pride in the media about their technological inventions. All of a sudden, they were con-
fronted with a major public transgression severely challenging all three types of legitimacy 
(see Suchman, 1995): Siemens’s pragmatic (or regulatory) legitimacy was clearly at risk giv-
en the threat of immense regulatory fines, imprisonment and the very survival of the organiza-
tion. The immense media coverage and criticism also from family and friends triggered an 
emotional consternation among Siemens staff worldwide, putting the organization’s cognitive 
legitimacy at risk. In an interview with Siemens Chief CO Josef Winter, the interviewer reca-
pitulated this ‘strong emotional shift from pride to consternation’ after the HQ raid and the ar-
rest of even Winter’s boss: “their company, which they always regarded as a kind of family, 
lost part of its honor. (...) That has been, says Winter, a shock for all.“ (Handelsblatt, Oct. 26, 
2010). Finally, given the moral consternation of Siemens staff and the forced termination of 
TI Germany membership in December 2006, its moral legitimacy was lost. “The proud Sie-
mens AG filed a petition in moral bankruptcy at that time” (Handelsblatt, Oct. 26, 2010). 
As direct response to the HQ raid in Nov. 2006 and resulting legitimacy shock, there was a 
sudden and unprecedented increase in all types of corruption controls shown in Table 1. 
“[S]uch a scandal helps and we were at the point where we could only change the 
course or sink. And in this first step I think we have taken the necessary measures that 
(…) have helped us, to leave this deep valley of scandal and turn towards a success 
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story. (…) Then the process of change started, but not gradually, but this compliance 
system was implemented under brute force.” (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012) 
Referring to the immense speed and substance of change at Siemens, summarized in Figure 
3a, the former FCPA monitor at Siemens assessed that “a tremendous act of rehabilitation has 
occurred within one year”. As regards leadership, Siemens hired Peter Löscher – the first ex-
ternally promoted CEO in the MNC’s history – as new CEO to manage the transgression. 
“Within months of my taking over, we replaced about 80% of the top level of executives, 
70% of the next level down, and 40% of the level below that. I fundamentally changed how 
our managing board made decisions. We also worked to streamline and simplify our global 
operating units.” (Löscher, 2012: 40). Compliance staff increased from around 60 (including 
part-time) to more than 600 fulltime employees. As outlined above, Siemens additionally en-
gaged in substantial Collective Action activities to promote its new compliance benchmark 
worldwide. The Siemens case hence outlines a clear and sudden shift from decoupling to sub-
stantial influence.  
Especially in the first years of its Collective Action program, the MNC exclusively pursued 
this ‘substantial influence’ strategy by determining fairly independently which types of con-
trols to implement and when (e.g., "how we can drive" Meyer and Waldschmidt, 2012). Only 
after the new compliance measures had been implemented, and especially since the successful 
termination of the FCPA monitorship in Dec. 2012 – marking the beginning of the post-
transgression period (tpost) –, did Siemens begin to include elements of ‘moral reasoning’. The 
perception that “we first stood under very strong pressure [ttrans] … Then we focused very 
strongly on roundtable discussions with other market actors [tpost]” (Senior CO, Siemens 
Switzerland, Dec. 2013) illustrates this shift from an exclusive focus on ‘substantial influ-
ence’ to including elements of ‘moral reasoning’. 
Compared to ttrans, the changes we noted in tpost were of much smaller scope: Rather than im-
plementing a set of new measures, the company’s main concern was to increase the efficiency 
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of the implemented compliance system. Another issue in that period was to focus collective 
actions to a larger extent on particular business requirements than in the past. For example, 
the company defined measures such as fair competition partnerships between bidders for large 
contracts or promoting voluntary self-commitment by industry federations to compliance 
standards (Siemens Annual Report 2012: 30). Respondents stated that targets formulated in 
our first round of interviews in late 2012 had been largely realized by the time of the second 
round in late 2013. As a Siemens CO outlined “in several areas where no incidents had been 
detected in the preceding years, the respective controls and compliance staff had been reduced 
and the thresholds for projects requiring ‘approval’ (…) had been eased”. Other processes 
were strengthened during that period, such as the ‘Business Partner Compliance Due Dili-
gence Tool’. While in place since 2008, respondents such as the regional compliance officer 
for Siemens ASEAN clarified that partner screenings were initially mostly based on Internet 
searches. In 2014, this process was complemented with on-site checks of business partners:  
“In fiscal 2014, we carried out a project to reinforce the effectiveness of our business-
partner compliance due diligence process and of management’s assessment of the re-
lated compliance risks. Key outcomes of the project include the regular review of 
business partner portfolios at the Lead Countries and Divisions and on-site compliance 
checks for selected types of business partners as part of due diligence.” (Siemens An-
nual Report, 2014) 
Synthesis. Siemens managed to achieve early in ttrans a 180-degree turn from a ‘decoupling’ 
strategy marked by an organizational structure of widespread corruption and façade-building 
to a ‘substantial influence’ strategy marked by an over-fulfillment of institutional expectations 
and the proactive promotion of its new compliance benchmark worldwide. We identified the 
reason for this radical shift to be nested in the firm’s legitimacy shock after the extraordinary 
‘way’ of disclosing corruption by means of a massive HQ raid. This shock’s strong emotional 
effect on Siemens employees worldwide triggered the general perception at Siemens that the 
only chance to recover was to respond radically, substantially and proactively. As Peter Lö-
scher continuously reminded his audience “never [to] miss the opportunities that come from a 
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good crisis” (Löscher, 2012: 40), adding that Siemens certainly did not miss theirs. After its 
exclusive focus on a ‘substantial influence’ strategy during early ttrans, Siemens increasingly 
added elements of ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘isomorphic adaptation’ with more and more time 
passing since the initial legitimacy shock. Regarding the former, Siemens renewed its mem-
bership with Transparency International in 2009, fully covered the indicator of the Global Re-
porting Initiative SO5 on participation in public policy development as of 2011, participated 
in ‘integrity dialogues’ with external stakeholders from 2013, and introduced integrity awards 
as well as warnings (‘yellow cards’) as of 2014 (see also Figure 3a). Regarding the latter, 
Siemens focused on increasing the efficiency of its compliance program, e.g., by slightly eas-
ing the previously very strict approval processes or abstaining from a separate board position 
to manage and oversee compliance. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 3a about here ------------------------------- 
Daimler’s gradual response and external enforcement boost 
Daimler faced a corruption transgression of similar (geographic) scope to the Siemens affair, 
involving high regulatory sanctions (see Table 2), yet pursued a significantly different reinte-
gration process. Nonetheless, the MNC finally also shifted toward ‘substantial influence’. The 
analysis of sanctions at Daimler suggests that pragmatic legitimacy was at risk whereas the 
other two types of legitimacy were largely unthreatened. We outline in the following that, be-
cause the way of disclosing the transgression was far less geared towards the media and social 
sanctions were mild, Daimler had – and may also have needed – time to make its global work-
force aware of the transgression. 
At Daimler, corruption controls in the period (tpre), i.e., before the transgression was officially 
disclosed in a settlement with the SEC on Apr. 01, 2010, were mainly bureaucratic (e.g., for-
malized rules and policies) and to a limited extend social/cultural or interactive (e.g., partici-
pating in voluntary initiatives like the UNGC). Daimler introduced further – at least basic – 
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measures, as the process chart (Figure 3b) shows. Social/cultural corruption controls were fos-
tered, e.g., through a statement by Dieter Zetsche outlining that “no business deal can ever 
justify putting our company’s reputation at risk“ (translated into English, speech delivered at 
the general assembly, April 2006), as well as relevant training and a whistle-blowing proce-
dure. Furthermore, Daimler increased its administrative corruption controls in 2005 by moni-
toring and following up cases of corruption (see GRI indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 in Figure 
3b). Considering that several of Daimler’s compliance controls had been previously applied 
elsewhere (for example at ABB), we identify elements of an ‘isomorphic adaptation’ strategy. 
Furthermore, Daimler applied already in tpre elements of ‘moral reasoning’, e.g., by participat-
ing in voluntary initiatives. However, the scope of transgressions disclosed at Daimler in tpre 
also reveals that systemic corrupt practices continued well into this period. Hence, ‘decou-
pling’ was a key strategy at that time (“Until the year 2008 we did not do that in a quality that 
we considered and consider as necessary” Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).  
Although Daimler faced fewer regulatory and social sanctions during ttrans than Siemens (see 
Table 2), we noted in tpost that its compliance program in many aspects comes close to that of 
Siemens. It contained strong social/cultural controls, including a close integration of compli-
ance in the board-level brief “Integrity and Legal Affairs” established in 2011, comprehensive 
anti-corruption training and a whistle-blowing procedure. Interestingly, yet to a lesser degree 
compared to Siemens, we now also found narratives at Daimler with a certain personal and 
emotional connotation: “the firm has pushed to stigmatize bribery, even in countries where it 
is a common business practice. ‘It’s no longer just a gentleman’s crime,’ she [Hohmann-
Dennhardt] said.” (Ensign, 2013, May 29). Similarly, clear anti-corruption signals from and to 
the leadership now referred to notions such as ‘self-servicing mentality’. On the other hand, 
administrative controls include risk assessments, monitoring and sanctions such as dismissals. 
Third-party bank accounts were significantly reduced, although value flow centralization was 
lower than at Siemens. 
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Observing the overlaps between the Siemens and Daimler compliance programs despite the 
significant differences in (social) sanctions led us to investigate the factors that may have in-
fluenced the transgression response process. After consulting further literature on contingen-
cies, press coverage and personal interviews, we learned about the powerful role of an exter-
nally imposed FCPA monitor exceeding by far the role of regular auditors. For example, the 
monitor can request access to all sorts of compliance-related documents, interview people in 
various hierarchical positions and visit foreign subsidiaries (Hartmann, 2012; Schwarz, 2011). 
Our analysis revealed that long during ttrans, corruption controls were implemented rather 
slowly and insufficiently. As the Spiegel (2011) reports about information regarding the 
strictly secret ‘First Follow-up Monitor Report’ by Louis Freeh (FCPA monitor at Daimler):  
“The Daimler-internal investigations of suspicious cases are too slow (…) Daimler 
does not scrutinize the efficiency of the initiated processes (…) The enterprise has not 
prevented ‘unethical behavior of managers’ consistently (…) At the moment, [Daim-
ler] would not fulfill the criteria of the US stock exchange supervision SEC.”  
Such references to slow yet insufficient change at Daimler point toward a combination of ‘de-
coupling’ and ‘isomorphic adaptation’. We further noted that “Daimler has not changed its 
leadership team. Daimler played it differently [than Siemens]” (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 
2012). The reasoning on why to abstain from a massive leadership exchange involves consid-
erations of fairness and open-ended communication with the Daimler workforce reflecting el-
ements of ‘moral reasoning’: 
“[M]any leaders grew up and studied in a world in which the perception existed that in 
some countries making business without facilitation payments, to name it that way, is 
not possible (…) I think it is fair to first inform and enable them to cope with this new 
context” (Senior CO, Daimler HQ, Nov. 2012). 
That is, the transgression was partly attributed to the educational background of managers –
foreign corruption had long been tax-deductible in Germany (Glynn et al., 1997) – and the 
perception of corruption as a common practice in several countries worldwide. 
External enforcement pressure. Interestingly and in stark contrast to Siemens, additional regu-
latory pressure and social attention/sanctions through the media were necessary to realize a 
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comprehensive compliance system at Daimler from late ttrans on. A Daimler senior CO depicts 
these developments over time and attributes the increased speed to pressure of the monitor: 
“Therefore we have [implemented] in the last three years, particularly though in the 
last two years as the monitor has pointed out very much stimulations in his first report, 
(…). Especially in the last two years an immense acceleration in our compliance man-
agement system has taken place.” (Nov. 2012) 
Daimler representatives convincingly outlined the particular processes behind this change, in-
cluding systematic processes to prevent and detect wrongdoing and efforts to change the pre-
viously criticized self-servicing mentality. These changes are backed by the positive judgment 
of the compliance monitor that “the weaknesses have become much smaller in the past two 
years and the strengths have become much larger" (Newswires, 2012). Hence, decoupling 
seems no longer to be a major strategy at Daimler in late ttrans. Our document analysis con-
firmed substantial changes in this context: “Daimler has, according to an internal list, dis-
missed 30 managers without notice, nine leaders received a contractual notice of dismissal. In 
addition Daimler restricted from business in various countries perceived as highly corrupt.” 
(Spiegel, 2011). Furthermore, in this period Daimler took a more active role in the UNGC by 
being among the first to join the UNGC LEAD initiative initiated in 2011 (“We meet [to dis-
cuss] the tenth principle twice a year, now really also to address corruption prevention” Sen-
ior CO, Daimler, Nov. 2012). This evidence indicates a thorough ‘moral reasoning’ strategy. 
Finally, we perceive the period after the transgression (tpost) to be heralded with the end of the 
DPA and monitorship in April 2013. As outlined above, Daimler also applied ‘substantial in-
fluence’ in this period. Daimler respondents highlighted in follow-up interviews conducted in 
tpost that the company chose to maintain a board brief for ‘Legal and Integrity’ even after the 
regulatory proceedings had ended, which we interpret as an indicator for the continuity of 
compliance efforts at Daimler. Interestingly, after the monitor’s criticism in the first report, 
the same monitor stated about one year later that Daimler was willing to go even beyond 
regulatory requirements and become a compliance benchmark worldwide. 
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Synthesis. Daimler’s initial response to the disclosed corruption in its 2010 DPA was rather 
slow and gradual with persisting elements of ‘decoupling’. Due to the significantly lower ini-
tial legitimacy loss compared to Siemens, there was no global awareness and willingness for 
radical change. However, by the end of the ‘rehabilitation’ stage (tpost) Daimler had also im-
plemented a comprehensive and balanced compliance program: instead of ‘decoupling’, we 
observed elements of ‘substantial influence’ (see Figure 3b). Our analysis revealed that, com-
pared to the Siemens case, Daimler’s accelerated response and strategy shift occurred much 
later. Daimler needed ‘external enforcement pressure’ from the FCPA compliance monitor to 
trigger broader awareness and elements of emotional involvement, whereas external enforce-
ment pressure at Siemens played a minor role due to the experienced legitimacy shock and re-
sulting emotional consternation. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 3b about here ------------------------------- 
ABB’s1 cyclical and partly inconsistent responses to repeated minor transgressions 
Our analysis of ABB’s corruption controls took a different course compared to the two other 
cases: Our ABB interview partners focused mainly on ABB’s present state of corruption con-
trols, i.e. the period tpost marked by the end of the DPA in September 2013. In this post-
transgression period we identified several strong and comprehensive social/cultural controls, 
notably training based on a case study of real (anonymized) past incidents of corruption, a 
sound and offensively communicated whistle-blowing procedure (including an information 
desk in the HQ lobby) and strong leadership support (including a separate board position). 
Significantly, we also noted personal emotional narratives at ABB in this period. On the one 
hand, our content analysis of ABB’s personal and written communication revealed that ABB 
refers mostly to integrity, rather than compliance. On the other hand, our conversations with 
two senior ABB representatives in 2012 and 2013 diverged several times from a purely ra-
tionalized question-&-answer process toward more personal and emotional reflections of the 
                                                
1 We are not permitted to use any quotes from our interviews with respondents at the ABB headquarters. 
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respondents, e.g., as regards the (ethical) role of corporations, the distinction between good 
and bad, corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. During these interviews, our respondents used no-
tions such as ‘being tired of rules’, ‘the individual personal aspect’ of integrity, and conse-
quences in case ‘you screw up’. However, apart from these strong social/cultural corruption 
control narratives and certain interactive controls – e.g., membership in TI, the UNGC and the 
Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) – we were not able to obtain detailed infor-
mation on administrative controls. The partially vague and ambiguous responses from our 
ABB interviewees together with the assessments from third parties suggest that ABB’s ad-
ministrative controls are less comprehensive compared to its social/cultural controls. As the 
CO of an industry peer puts during our interview in Dec. 2013: 
“In the control system [referring to administrative controls], I believe, ABB has weak-
nesses today (…) We compare notes on this issue (…) and ABB also openly com-
municates that they did not invest as much in the implementation of a control system 
…”. 
A gap between the ABB headquarters perception and our own as well as third-party observa-
tions about the company’s handling of the transgression is evident in the processes of risk as-
sessment, monitoring, following up of incidents, and sanctions. For example, ABB mainly re-
lies on annual surveys and the audit department to conduct corruption-risk assessments (Sie-
mens has special ‘compliance’ assessment teams in addition to the audit department). Fur-
thermore, ABB’s reporting on these issues is less comprehensive compared to the other case 
firms in tpost. In sum, ABB displays on the one hand elements of ‘substantial influence’ and 
‘moral reasoning’. On the other hand, the gap between the image of ABB as a leader in anti-
corruption management, which our interviewees painted, and the gaps between ABB’s admin-
istrative controls and the industry’s best practices that we perceive, and an industry peer and 
other external experts corroborated, may suggest that certain forms of decoupling were pre-
sent after the second settlement. 
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In ttrans, the period marked by the SEC settlement including a three-year DPA starting in Sep-
tember 2010, ABB faced lower regulatory sanctions and almost negligible social sanctions 
(see Table 2) compared to Siemens. This suggests that none of the three legitimacy types was 
severely threatened. Notably, in contrast to Daimler and Siemens, ABB was not scrutinized 
by an external monitor, while lawyers, consultants and auditors conducted more limited inves-
tigations than at Daimler and especially at Siemens. Overall, it cannot be said that external au-
thorities left ‘no stone unturned’ in ABB’s case. Consequently, instead of establishing a sys-
tem that would help it achieve full transparency about every business process, ABB chose the 
possibly less resource-intensive approach of preventing corrupt behavior by attempting to 
change the mindset of its employees. 
While respondents from all three firms mentioned the powerful role of the SEC, ABB inter-
viewees downplayed the effect of the 2008–2010 transgression disclosure and settlement on 
the company’s anti-corruption strategy. They admitted that there was a whole list of organiza-
tional requirements that the company had to fulfill in order to comply with the FCPA. Further, 
considering that their rhetoric revealed a confidence that the company would not have to in-
troduce drastic changes indicates the application of an ‘isomorphic adaptation’ strategy. From 
ttrans onwards ABB pursued this strategy by orienting itself more to the practices already im-
plemented at competitors like Siemens: A comparison of the slogans of each company’s com-
pliance program (Siemens: ‘Prevent, Detect, Respond’; ABB ‘Prevent, Detect, Resolve’) sup-
ports this impression. While our respondents could not specify when and why these slogans 
were conceived, our document analysis revealed that Siemens has used its slogan in public 
reports since 2009 (e.g. Annual Report, 2009: 59), whereas the first ABB document we found 
using this slogan was published on April 1, 2012 (“The ABB integrity program”: 3). Similar-
ly, Siemens’s slogan ‘Only clean business is Siemens business – everywhere – everybody – 
every time’ (see Moosmayer and Winter, 2011: 4, indicating that the slogan originated in a 
Löscher speech between 2007 and 2008) is later echoed in ABB’s code of conduct: ‘We ex-
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pect this [acting ethically and with integrity] of every single ABB employee, in every loca-
tion, every day’ (ABB Code of Conduct, 2013: 4). References in the DPA like “following dis-
covery of the bribery, ABB (...) voluntarily and timely disclosed to the (...) SEC the miscon-
duct“ and “ABB Ltd conducted a thorough internal investigation of that and other miscon-
duct“ (ABB DPA, 2010: 4) suggest a termination of ‘decoupling’. However, the identified 
gap between ABB and third party perceptions leaves us uncertain as to whether some ele-
ments of ‘decoupling’ may have persisted at ABB in this period (see Figure 3c). 
A central reason behind ABB’s introduction of considerable corruption controls in the period 
(tpre) prior to the SEC settlement and DPA became apparent only after the second round of in-
terviews and analysis: An earlier settlement between ABB and the SEC in 2004. The smaller-
scale settlement (bribes of US$ 1.1 million and a penalty of US$ 10.5 million, compared to 
the 2010 settlement involving at least US$ 2.7 million in illicit payments and a penalty of 
US$ 39.3 million) and the early date may explain why we did not initially notice it. Neverthe-
less, our analysis (see Figure 3c) shows that (in tpre) ABB was indeed the first of our three 
case firms to install certain corruption controls, especially social/cultural ones as outlined 
above, which points to strategies of ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘(substantial) influence’. Consider-
ing that the SEC found ABB’s integrity program deficient on several counts in the 2010 set-
tlement (“ABB, through its officers, agents and subsidiaries, failed to detect and prevent the 
illicit payments revealing a lack of effective internal controls“ SEC Complaint, 2010: 19), 
‘decoupling’ is likely to have persisted at ABB after the first (2004) settlement. 
Synthesis. ABB’s response process appears sometimes inconsistent to us: Existing models of 
organizational corruption control (e.g. Lange, 2008) do not explain why ABB focused its re-
sponse on social controls rather than administrative ones, although it faced mainly regulatory 
rather than social sanctions. So we need to consider other contingencies. As Figure 3c shows, 
ABB displays the most diverse spectrum of legitimacy strategies, especially in tpost, ranging 
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from potentially persistent elements of ‘decoupling’ to indications of best practices and ‘(sub-
stantial) influence’. In contrast, Siemens clearly focused on just one strategy (‘substantial in-
fluence’) directly after the HQ raid, which drastically disclosed the transgression, and Daimler 
slightly narrowed its strategy portfolio especially after the monitor critique. The fact that ABB 
was involved in two transgressions each causing only lower to minimal loss of legitimacy, 
without critical events (HQ raid or strong monitor critique) demanding immediate and deci-
sive responses, may explain this persisting wide spectrum of legitimacy strategies. 
Furthermore, our case firm responses in the context of disclosed transgressions and legitimacy 
loss all display a considerably different temporality. First, the legitimacy shock at Siemens af-
ter the HQ raid triggered one radical change process of unprecedented speed. Second, Daimler 
also initiated one continuous change process after the official corruption disclosure in the 
DPA but its response only gained higher speed and substance after the monitor critique. 
Third, ABB’s response – while also nonlinear – was rather separated in two response cycles 
of similar scope: Compared to the two other case firms, ABB had realized considerably big-
ger strategic changes including elements of ‘(substantial) influence’ already after the first set-
tlement, yet prior to the DPA. This latter transgression then no longer had sufficient clout to 
further expand or even focus on ‘substantial influence’; rather the changes realized at ABB in 
this second response cycle fostered the persistence of ABB’s wide strategy portfolio. 
We can hence conclude that for a transgression to trigger a holistic set of innovative and com-
prehensive anti-corruption processes, a certain level of legitimacy loss or urgency is neces-
sary, even if it places the transgressor in the role of a first mover. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 3c about here ------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Legitimacy loss seems ubiquitous in today’s globalized economy with multiple heterogeneous 
and changing demands. Hence, any modern organization operating in such an environment 
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may be concerned sooner or later, if not continuously, with managing strategic responses to 
legitimacy loss (Scherer et al., 2013; Pfarrer et al., 2008). The main purpose of this case study 
was to investigate how and why organizations respond to the loss of legitimacy in the context 
of disclosed corruption. Research on responses to such a legitimacy loss is scarce, so we need 
theoretical development to better understand these contexts. Our study revealed a shift from 
decoupling to substantial influence at all our case firms resulting from legitimacy loss and an 
emotional reaction, such as consternation, after disclosed corruption. However, we found con-
siderable differences in the dynamics, chronology and intensity of organizational strategies: 
Only the combination of high regulatory and social pressure leading to a legitimacy shock, 
which we observed in the Siemens case, may trigger radical change in a firm’s anti-corruption 
strategy. Siemens acted instantly and drastically, choosing a clear strategy of ‘substantial in-
fluence’ and its best practices served as examples for other transgressors and industry peers. 
In addition, the intensive legal investigations and screenings created an unprecedented level 
of transparency at Siemens, enabling the company to break the taboo and openly communi-
cate its corrupt history as well as its lessons from implementing substantial corruption con-
trols. In contrast the responses at Daimler followed a very different temporality and strategy 
mix, the former only accelerating its organizational change process after external enforcement 
during the transgression period. Elements of ‘decoupling’ gave way to those of ‘substantial 
influence’ only later and less drastically. ABB responded in two distinct cycles to repeated 
loss of legitimacy, acting partly as a pioneer in the first (‘substantial influence’) and more as a 
follower in the second (‘isomorphic adaption’). 
This study contributes to developing theory on organizational strategies in the context of le-
gitimacy loss. In particular, we emphasize four components in the following subsections. 
First, we identify a new legitimacy strategy called ‘substantial influence’, and outline how its 
firm-driven and emotional elements question the assumptions of predominantly rationalized 
and stakeholder-driven response processes on which previous anti-corruption models rely 
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(Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Second, we outline significant difference in the 
temporality and chronology of organizational responses. While the legitimacy shock (at Sie-
mens) triggers more expeditious and radical changes, recent trends in regulatory procedures 
such as the DPA and monitorship (at Daimler) – also referred to as restorative justice or crea-
tive sentencing (Bertels et al., 2014) – or repeated settlements (at ABB) trigger more gradual 
or cyclical change. Third, our study clarifies previous assumptions on employing strategic 
manipulation to regain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995) by dis-
tinguishing between two extremes: decoupling and substantial influence (bottom of Figure 4). 
Finally, our study reveals the conditions under which organizations choose multiple versus 
single legitimacy strategies in an attempt to repair their legitimacy in heterogeneous environ-
ments. 
‘Substantial influence’ resulting from high legitimacy loss and emotional consternation 
In contrast to the suggestions of previous research that companies facing an unprecedented 
transgression – like Enron, WorldCom or Tyco – may not recover due to the enormous stigma 
that ‘first movers’ suffer (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Goffman, 2009), our study reveals that ‘first 
movers’ may indeed be able to regain legitimacy by substantially influencing their environ-
ment. Particularly, we argue that high levels of legitimacy loss, and especially a legitimacy 
shock (center of Figure 2), i.e., a radical loss of legitimacy due to exceptionally high regulato-
ry and social sanctions, increases the chances that transgressors will make wholesale and radi-
cal changes. Our findings further suggest that conventional reintegration models (Bertels et 
al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008) may fail to explain accurately the process by which transgres-
sors respond to legitimacy loss or even shock. 
On the one hand, the reintegration literature tended to view organizational responses to legit-
imacy loss as primarily and continuously stakeholder driven suggesting that organizational re-
sponses closely follow stakeholder claims as evolving over the different reintegration stages 
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(Pfarrer et al., 2008). Similarly, the literature on institutional determinism (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) views organizations as passive actors, which isomorphically adapt to and con-
form with the expectations in their institutional environment. In contrast, the ‘substantial in-
fluence’ strategy identified here sheds light on firm-driven responses that proactively shape 
and influence these stakeholder or institutional demands through substantial organizational 
actions. That is, the organization defines a new benchmark for the field, which stakeholders 
then acknowledge and take for granted as new standard. This latter view of organizational ac-
tors complements initial arguments on proactivity through ‘technical actions’, i.e., “ones that 
have the potential to address the causes of wrongdoing and thus attract the media and stake-
holders’ attention to the internal processes of a firm” in the crisis and impression management 
literature (Zavyalova et al., 2012: 1080). Not only did the substantial (or ‘technical’) actions 
at Siemens attenuate the negative effect of its own wrongdoing (Zavyalova et al., 2012), but 
the unprecedented extent of these actions even influenced its peers, the public and regulators 
to perceive Siemens as a new compliance benchmark. 
On the other hand, previous models pictured MNCs as organizations consisting of rational top 
management and staff and characterized by well-thought-out decisions based on all relevant 
facts and options. Pfarrer et al. (2008: 735), for example, describe the outcome of the ‘discov-
ery stage’ as the ‘facts of the transgression’. Similarly, although the reintegration process that 
Bertels et al. (2014) describe is more nuanced (outlining, e.g., the escalation paths of regulato-
ry pressure), the authors primarily consider rational factors and largely ignore the emotional 
(personal) factors that determine the transgressor’s response to a transgression (see legitimacy 
shock legend of Figure 2). Also with reference to rationality, a central assumption in institu-
tional theory is that organizations follow ‘rationalized myths’, that is, taken-for-granted rules 
or demands in its institutional environment, and hence pursue strategies of decoupling or iso-
morphism (here: isomorphic adaptation) (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). However, in the context of (high) legitimacy loss, we theorize that not only the ‘ration-
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alized myths’ or ‘facts of a transgression’ (e.g., monetary fines and regulatory sanctions), but 
also – if not predominantly – the personal and emotional involvement of the organization’s 
members explain the ‘substantial influence’ strategy of our transgressors. On those grounds, 
we argue that emotions (Baumeister et al., 2007) are key to conceptualizing how transgressors 
reintegrate themselves into their environment after a transgression.  
Creed et al. (2014) provide an analysis of the mechanisms through which shame, a self-
directed emotion, affects people’s willingness to participate in institutional processes. Recog-
nizing that maintaining social bonds is a ‘crucial human motive’ (Scheff, 1990: 4), the authors 
argue that shame signalizes that social bonds are at risk and triggers efforts to preserve these 
bonds (Baumeister et al., 2007). We build on the idea that shame can act as a means of inter-
subjective surveillance and self-regulation and suggest that personal emotions like shame 
trigger the quest for substantial organizational change to secure or re-establish social bonds. 
The public-oriented raid by 200 police officers and officials at the Siemens headquarters in 
Munich, and to a certain extent the prominently published critique of Daimler’s FCPA moni-
tor, can thus be regarded as instances of shaming. Previous reintegration literature has viewed 
shaming exclusively from the stakeholder perspective and treated it as a later stage in the rein-
tegration process situated after ‘discovery’ and ‘explanation’ (Pfarrer et al., 2008: 739; 
Braithwaite, 1989). We complement this literature by highlighting that shaming may have an 
even bigger effect on organizational responses if situated at the very beginning of the trans-
gression, and by explaining the effect of shaming by focusing on the firm (rather than stake-
holder) perspective. 
Previous research focused on how emotions spread collective corruption within an organiza-
tion (Smith-Crowe and Warren, 2014). In contrast, our findings outline how emotions can be 
used to trigger efforts against organizational corruption. We propose that such emotions are 
crucial to overcome rationalized routines that may have led organizations to continuously ap-
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ply decoupling and isomorphic adaptation strategies by activating personal attention, motiva-
tion and conviction for substantial change among organizational members. The legitimacy 
shock at Siemens, by triggering a strong emotional shift from pride to consternation, enabled 
the general acceptance of radical change. Metaphor-laden narratives such as ‘change the 
course or sink’ fostered the emotional involvement of the workforce. Similarly, ABB aimed 
to secure its employees’ personal and emotional involvement by strongly focusing on a value- 
and principle-based integrity approach rather than a ‘tiring’ rule-based compliance approach. 
Especially after the monitoring critique, Daimler also tried to reach the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
its managers and employees by changing their ‘mentality’ and ‘stigmatizing’ corruption.  
Varying temporalities in organizational responses: The role of a legitimacy shock versus 
regulatory sanctions  
The Siemens response was marked by a sudden and substantial change in organizational strat-
egy right after the MNC was hit by the legitimacy shock. Daimler, especially before the moni-
tor critique, and ABB after its second transgression followed a much slower and more gradual 
(Daimler) and cyclical (ABB) reintegration path (see differently curved arrows in Figures 2 
and 3a-c), which is more in line with conceptual reintegration models: Pfarrer et al. (2008) 
distinguish four reintegration stages: discovery, explanation, penance and rehabilitation. 
According to this model, during the ‘discovery’ stage, Daimler waited until most facts had 
been collected and disclosed, and abstained from a sudden response. In the ‘explanation’ and 
‘penance’ stages, Daimler took the time to reflect on why the transgression happened and how 
the organization should respond, whereas Siemens had practically skipped large parts of the 
‘discovery’ and the entire ‘explanation’ stages. We thus propose that in the absence of a legit-
imacy shock, e.g., if ‘only’ pragmatic legitimacy is at risk whereas cognitive legitimacy (the 
taken-for-granted acceptance of the organization) remains unchallenged, several aspects of 
previous reintegration models (Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008) hold. In this case, 
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transgressors may judge that they can afford to wait until they have all the facts before they 
seek and provide appropriate explanations, enter into regulatory agreements by way of repara-
tions, and implement organizational changes in line with these agreements, following the four 
stages (discovery, explanation, penance and rehabilitation) Pfarrer et al. (2008) identified. 
Furthermore, we suggest that in the absence of a legitimacy shock, continued regulatory pres-
sure plays a crucial role in triggering transgressor responses. Repeated or escalating external 
pressure may be necessary for transgressors to develop comprehensive controls and imple-
ment leading practices in the fight against corruption, as the model put forward by Bertels et 
al. (2014) suggests. Our findings, especially those on Daimler, identify external compliance 
monitors as very effective – though overlooked in recent research – means of triggering a 
much higher dynamic in organizational change through escalating pressure. The Daimler case 
in particular illustrates that the presence of an external monitor during the process of regain-
ing regulatory legitimacy influenced significantly the transgressor’s reintegration strategy. 
This is also of interest to practitioners and scholars concerned with CSR initiatives or stand-
ards. In the context of schemes like the UNGC, our study shows that in situations where the 
transgression and the transgressor’s power are not extreme (Daimler as opposed to Siemens), 
imposing external and stringent monitoring on the disgraced members may facilitate and ac-
celerate their learning progress (Schembera, 2016). While the UNGC so far lacks resources to 
install direct monitoring (Rasche, 2009), one pragmatic solution would be to establish a fund 
to collect the necessary resources for appointing teams that monitor UNGC members. 
Finally, our findings in the ABB case show that regulatory proceedings like the DPA that are 
closed only after the successful implementation of a set of agreed organizational corruption 
controls are effective in cases of low transgression prominence. After its first transgression, 
ABB was only obliged to pay monetary fines, and the company failed to implement a holistic 
set of corruption controls. After the second transgression, which was again of low promi-
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nence, US regulators and ABB entered a DPA with a list of required corruption controls, 
which turned out to be effective for ABB to realize more holistic organizational changes. 
The two extremes of strategic manipulation: Decoupling versus substantial influence 
Previous legitimacy research falls short in distinguishing our transgressors’ strategy shift over 
time, and instead would refer to all strategies as ‘(strategic) manipulation’ (see, e.g., Oliver, 
1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995; Child and Rodrigues, 2011). A main reason for 
this limitation is that previous research refers to manipulation strategies mainly as a public re-
lations tool that organizations employ to manipulate or co-opt the perceptions of critical 
stakeholders, without actually modifying the practices that these stakeholders criticize 
(Scherer et al., 2013: 266; Oliver, 1991: 159). To capture the commonly observed strategy 
shift, we thus propose to distinguish between two extreme variants of strategic manipulation: 
‘decoupling’ and ‘substantial influence’ (see Figure 4). Both variants contain an organiza-
tion’s attempt to manipulate its environment. However, the former involves no or minimal 
change of actual organizational practices, whereas the latter involves a very comprehensive 
change of actual organizational practices. ‘Substantial influence’ can hence be defined as an 
organization’s radical and active effort to (1) manipulate public perceptions, and (2) change 
its own organizational practices. Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the two variants. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 4 about here ------------------------------- 
Given these differences between the two strategic manipulation variants, we propose to ab-
stain from referring to strategic manipulation in general and, in order to avoid ambiguity, in-
stead to specify whether decoupling or substantial influence is at play. The presented findings 
support our initial suggestion that in recent legitimacy literature (Scherer et al., 2013) strate-
gic manipulation (Suchman, 1995; Oliver, 1991) can be mostly equated with a ‘decoupling’ 
strategy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) (see left side of Figure 4). Both strategy concepts are 
based on the assumption that organizations achieve legitimacy by constructing a façade of or-
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ganizational structures and processes that reflects institutional myths (shaped, e.g., by expec-
tations concerning proper business practices) without adjusting their organizational practices 
to match the projected image. 
We furthermore suggest that the other observed extreme variant of strategic manipulation 
should be labeled and defined as ‘substantial influence’ (see right side of Figure 4). While el-
ements of this strategy do appear in previous studies – e.g., Nike’s decision to disclose the 
names of its supply-chain partners (Scherer et al., 2013: 268) – such earlier works focused on 
cooperation with civil society organizations and described this approach as a ‘proactive moral 
reasoning’ strategy. However, in contrast to ‘proactive moral reasoning’, the ‘substantial in-
fluence’ strategy, as we described and defined it, does not involve open-ended discourses be-
tween organizations and their stakeholders, but clear and predefined targets. In sum, distin-
guishing between the strategies of decoupling and substantial influence allows to contribute to 
the organizational reintegration (e.g. Pfarrer et al., 2008) and legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; 
Scherer et al., 2013) literatures by capturing a holistic typology of organizational  strategies in 
the context of legitimacy loss. 
Multiple versus single legitimacy strategies: What works when? 
Theoretical assumptions on the use of legitimacy strategies vary greatly and we perceive the 
need to clarify the conditions under which the different assumptions hold true. The contradic-
tions between different approaches – namely, the resource-based view (Christmann, 2000; 
Hart, 1995), discourse ethics (Stansbury, 2009) and institutional theory (Delmas, 2002; 
Schaefer, 2007) – give the impression that a corporation only applies one legitimacy strategy 
at a time. Palazzo and Scherer (2006) argue that choosing between different legitimacy strate-
gies in a globalized economy does not work as smoothly as it once did (see Oliver, 1991). 
Scherer et al. (2013), therefore, suggest that in heterogeneous environments that place con-
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flicting demands on corporations, a favorable way to maintain or regain legitimacy may be to 
combine different and potentially contradictory legitimacy strategies. 
Our findings on Daimler and ABB reveal that nowadays transnationally operating organiza-
tions indeed tend to apply a mix of different legitimacy strategies in order to manage the het-
erogeneous anti-corruption expectations they face. Both firms combined strategies of ‘iso-
morphic adaptation’ with ‘moral reasoning’. Combining ‘decoupling’ with other legitimacy 
strategies turned out to be problematic, however. ABB temporarily combined elements of 
‘decoupling’ even with the other extreme variant of strategic manipulation ‘substantial influ-
ence’. While Scherer et al. (2013) suggested that contradictory legitimacy strategies may be 
applied simultaneously in complex environments, the reoccurrence of regulatory sanctions at 
ABB illustrated the limitations of such an approach. The Siemens case, in contrast, indicates 
that in complex institutional environments, a radical shift from ‘decoupling’ to ‘substantial in-
fluence’ appears more promising with regard to avoiding additional regulatory sanctions.  
Boundary conditions and future research 
A common question in case study research concerns the transferability of findings. We con-
sider a key strength of our study that it analyzes multiple cases from which not only common 
themes across cases emerged, but also fundamental differences; this combination arguably 
provided us with a good basis for deriving more general suggestions on the relation between 
legitimacy loss and organizational response. While we studied MNCs as a prototype case of 
organizations responding to legitimacy loss in a complex environment, our findings may well 
be transferable to other large and public organizations facing similarly heterogeneous de-
mands. On the one hand, considering that our case firm’s slightly varying industry context 
was not a major factor in explaining organizational responses, generalizations may also hold 
across industries. On the other hand, considering that multinational organizations like FIFA 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association), IAAF (International Association of Ath-
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letics Federations) or UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale) are also large powerful actors fac-
ing high public prominence and heterogeneous (anti-)corruption demands, certain elements of 
our findings may be also transferable to ‘non-profit’ organizations. 
As regards the type of transgression, because bribery was a particular common, yet not the 
only, type of corruption observed at our case firms, and the particular type of transgression 
helped little in explaining organizational responses, our findings may hold as well for other 
cases of legitimacy loss. Caution, however, seems necessary when deriving generalizations of 
our model for organizations that are not originated in low corruption risk countries as studied 
here. For example, due to potentially different social norms and/or transparency standards (i.e. 
risk of transgression disclosure and information exchange with Western authorities), a Chi-
nese MNC may experience less of a legitimacy loss in its home country after transgressions 
similar to the Siemens or Daimler case. Consequently, future research may focus on responses 
to legitimacy loss of organizations originated in such perceived high-corruption risk countries. 
We further acknowledge possible limitations with regard to the global level of analysis that 
we applied in our study. While we aimed to include a global perspective in our study – by ob-
taining data from various MNC locations worldwide – our focus was more on the central and 
common processes in the transgressors’ global strategy change. It was beyond the scope of 
this paper to scrutinize in depth differential strategy shifts across MNC subsidiaries (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). Our level of analysis was hence predominantly global rather than local. Fu-
ture research is needed to zoom in on these differential processes across the various locations 
of multinational organization, for example, by looking at different types of network struc-
tures, value systems, and power relations. 
To conclude, by empirically analyzing organizational strategies in the context of legitimacy 
loss, we found a common shift from ‘decoupling’ to ‘substantial influence’. Our findings go 
beyond the existing literature in that they show how emotions enable organizations to deviate 
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from rationalized routines or ‘myths’ to realize substantial firm-driven change that goes be-
yond institutional or stakeholder expectations. We further outlined that there seems to be no 
prototype or ideal way of responding to legitimacy loss; rather several transgression charac-
teristics such as previous sanctions, prominent disclosures and external enforcement pressure 
determine the chronology of strategies and speed of strategy shifts. Several studies have theo-
rized this response process from different angles (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Bertels et al., 2014). 
However, future research is needed to empirically validate or specify existing models as well 
as focus on the particular challenges of multinational organizations operating in complex het-
erogeneous environments. 
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Figure 1: Data structure 
  
Figure 2: Organizational Strategies in the Context of Legitimacy Loss 
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Figure 3 (a-c): Individualized case firm process timelines 
 
Legend (for Figures 3a-c): 
• *Any type of comparative analysis (e.g. most/biggest/strongest/first, less/least , ...) is in relation to the three 
case firms, if not stated otherwise  
• DPA = Deferred Prosecution Agreement; monitorship = external monitor imposed by SEC 
• SO2–SO5 (Global Reporting Initiative indicators): SO2 (percentage and total number of business units ana-
lyzed for risks related to corruption); SO3 (percentage of employees trained in the organization’s anti-
corruption policies and procedures); SO4 (actions taken in response to incidents of corruption); SO5 (Public 
policy positions and participation in public policy development and lobbying) 
• PACI = Partnering Against Corruption Initiative; TI = Transparency International 
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Figure 4: Two extreme variants of ‘strategic manipulation’ 
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Table 1: Relating Corruption Control Elements and Legitimacy Strategies 
Type Corruption Control Elements Legitimacy strategies 
Social/cultural 
corruption con-
trols 
Leadership support 
• SC: high-level personnel as overseer (see also: 
Pfarrer et al., 2008) 
• CC: strategic integration and leadership support 
M
or
al
 r
ea
so
ni
ng
 
Su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
 Training 
• SC: effective communication 
• CC: training 
• See also OCC: self-controls 
 Whistle-blowing procedure 
• OCC: vigilance controls; concertive controls (hor-
izontal surveillance by coworkers) 
• CC: creation of a complaints procedure 
Administrative 
corruption con-
trols 
 
Bureaucratic controls  
• OCC: formalized rules, policies (see also: Pfarrer 
et al., 2008), hierarchical and centralized structure, 
specialized positions 
• SC: compliance standards and procedures; due 
care in delegating substantial discretionary author-
ity 
Is
om
or
ph
ic
 a
da
pt
at
io
n 
 
D
ec
ou
pl
in
g 
 (i
f i
m
pl
em
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d 
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os
el
y 
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na
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) 
 Alignment of incentives 
• OCC: incentive alignments 
• CC: alignment of incentive structures (see also: 
Pfarrer et al., 2008) 
 Monitoring and follow-up 
• SC: monitoring, auditing, reporting; enforcement 
and disciplinary mechanisms; response upon detec-
tion 
• OCC: punishment (measuring, monitoring and 
sanctions) 
• CC: evaluation 
Interactive cor-
ruption controls 
 
Collective Action  
• CC: quality of stakeholder relationships; level of 
participation in collaborative CC initiatives 
• Beyond OCC and SC 
 
Legend: 
• CC = Corporate Citizenship Assessment Tool (Baumann-Pauly and Scherer, 2013) 
• OCC = Organizational Corruption Control Circumplex (Lange, 2008) 
• SC = Sentencing Commission Guidelines (USSC, 2010) 
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Table 2: Classification of transgression sanctions 
Company Type of  
sanction 
Magnitude of sanction 
Siemens Regulatory 
sanctions  
(fines & org. 
compliance 
costs) 
In December 2008, Siemens entered an agreement to settle the FCPA-related charg-
es it had been called to pay, including the installation of an external monitor for a 
period of four years until December 2012 (SEC, 2008c). In a settlement with the 
World Bank in July 2009, Siemens committed to pay $100 million over the follow-
ing 15 years to support anti-corruption work. The fines imposed by US and German 
regulatory authorities amount to more than $1.6 billion; the organizational costs for 
rehabilitation are expected to surpass this figure. The costs for organizational 
changes made in response to these regulatory requirements are probably even high-
er. In addition, a 2009 settlement with the World Bank included, for example, “a 
commitment by Siemens to pay $100 million over the next 15 years to support anti-
corruption work” (WBG, 2009). Altogether, we can ascertain with confidence that 
fines and costs involved in this Siemens corruption transgression are unprecedent-
ed. 
 Social 
sanctions  
(reputation 
loss & promi-
nence of 
transgression) 
As we learnt in the course of our interviews, the disclosure of the transgression was 
rather unique and had an immense effect on social sanctions: In November 2006, 
around 200 policemen and officials turned up at the Munich headquarters to confis-
cate material relevant to the corruption cases at Siemens and arrested Siemens em-
ployees of the communication sector (SEC, 2008a). This “Dawn Raid” is likely to 
have made the magnitude of the problem obvious to almost every Siemens employ-
ee around the world and triggered an unprecedented level of negative media cover-
age on corporate corruption (see RepRisk, 2013). Even more, closely after this 
event, the prominent normative anti-corruption institution Transparency Interna-
tional Germany terminated Siemens’s membership in December 2006. Overall, we 
perceive social sanctions to be by far the highest among our case firms. 
Daimler Regulatory 
sanctions 
The fines Daimler paid to settle the SEC charges with the SEC and the DOJ 
amounted to around $185 million in total. Furthermore, an external monitor was 
installed pointing out major organizational compliance deficits (Spiegel, 2011); 
hence, the organizational costs to achieve rehabilitation are likely to be substantial. 
Although fines and related costs at Daimler can be described as high, they do not 
reach the level of burdens at Siemens. 
 Social 
sanctions 
The corrupt practices were disclosed by the SEC in March 2010 and the agreed 
DPA lasted from March 2010 to March 2013, so the Daimler transgression erupted 
at least one and a half years after the Siemens transgression. This may also explain 
why Daimler was not as much in the spotlight as Siemens, reflected in the signifi-
cantly lower level of media coverage on corruption risks at Daimler (RepRisk, 
2013). In the Daimler case, there was also no big and sudden investigative act to 
trigger instant and massive public awareness. The level of social sanctions is thus 
rather moderate compared to Siemens. 
ABB Regulatory 
sanctions 
To settle the SEC charges, ABB agreed to pay more than $39.3 million. In this case, 
no external monitor was appointed, which together with the requirements listed in 
the DPA (DOJ, 2010) indicates that the organizational costs for rehabilitation are 
considerably lower than those of Siemens and Daimler. 
 Social 
sanctions 
The three-year DPA agreed with the SEC started in September 2010, almost two 
years after the Siemens agreement; moreover, the scope of the corrupt practices was 
limited to a few countries. This may indicate the rather low media coverage on 
compliance risks, especially compared to the Siemens case (see also Table 3) sup-
ports our assessment: from 2006 to 2013, we found only 10 entries on corruption-
related reputation risk concerning ABB in the RepRisk database, compared to 138 
for Siemens and 40 for Daimler (RepRisk, 2013). In sum, social sanctions are low-
est among case firms. 
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Table 3: Data sources and corresponding perspectives in the analysis 
Data types 
Siemens Daimler ABB Third parties 
(lawyers, audi-
tors, NGOs, offi-
cials) 
Perspective 
(purpose: trian-
gulation) 
Interviews 
(Germany 
and Switzer-
land) 
3 2 2 (2 inform-
ants each) 
4 (+ 1 formal and 
several informal 
interviews with 
academics) 
Corporate head-
quarter 
Interviews 
(Australia) 
2 1 1 3 (+ 3 formal and 
several informal 
interviews with 
academics) 
Corporate global 
(low perceived 
corruption risk) 
Interviews 
(Southeast 
Asia) 
4 1 (2 inform-
ants) 
2 (now at 
Siemens) 
11 Corporate global 
(high perceived 
corruption risk) 
FCPA related 
documents 
6 3 6 1 Regulatory 
Company re-
ports and pol-
icies 
20 14 20 - Corporate per-
spective (details 
on processes, 
structures and 
performance) 
Rep-Risk 
(Sep. 04, 
2013) & other 
media 
152 45 10 - Public/societal 
perspective 
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Table 4: Representative evidence from interview data 
Perceived institutional challenges 
Perceived 
environment 
Code: Discrepancies between local social norms and legislation 
‘Sometimes it is not just the political will, it’s the whole culture of getting things done. (...) And 
for people who don’t understand the cultural difference between the two countries, they won’t 
accept that as normal’ (Singapore Global Compact Network, President, Mar. 2014). 
‘There are differences in the understanding of corruption and the tolerance level. (...) So in some 
cultures, certain practices, although people know it is not right, they are commonly accepted’ 
(Daimler Greater China, (Chinese) CM, Mar. 2014). 
‘Malaysia's got some of the best legislation in the world, but the political and social will to en-
force it is often lacking’ (TI Malaysia, Program manager, Apr. 2014). 
Code: MNC facing heterogeneous corruption risks 
‘Of course there are different risks in different countries’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Someone in Australia might say “you tell me I need to do x,y,z, but because I am low risk, I am 
going to do the low risk strategy” whereas “because I am in China, I am going to do the high 
risk strategy”’ (Large professional services firm, Australia, Senior manager, Mar. 2013). 
‘The Australian culture is less prone to corruption because it is not seen as a cultural norm, 
whereas in other countries … (ABB Australia, IO & Regional counsel, May 2013). 
‚Insofar corruption quite is an everyday issue in Indonesia. This is of course completely different 
in Germany’ (KADIN Business Support Desk Indonesia, Mar. 2014).* 
‚So they are basically killing themselves in a market like the Philippines. That's what they real-
ized. It's like inflicting pain on yourself. You are allowed to bribe in this country here, welcome! 
But my parents would kill me’ (ECCP Philippines, Mar. 2014). 
Rising insti-
tutional ex-
pectations 
Code: Growing legislation on corruption of foreign officials 
‘Compliance and its increasing significance have to be regarded in historical context. Until 1999 
these topics were tax-deductible as beneficial expenditures’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The changes in the legal landscape caused by Germany's ratification of the QECD Convention 
and Siemens' listing on the NYSE should have put an end to bribery at Siemens. Unfortunately, 
they did not.’ (SEC Compliant, Dec. 2008) 
‘UK pressed ahead with the criminal liability of facilitation payments. FPs are not exempted 
from criminal liability in the UK Bribery Act’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Singapore has a law similar to the UK Bribery Act, or the FCPA, wherein they can be prosecut-
ed for foreign corrupt acts’ (CSR ASEAN, Manager, Mar. 2014). 
Code: Growing enforcement of legislation 
‘The department of public prosecution in Munich has discovered criminal conviction in the con-
text of this legislation as some source of income. (…) There are high pressure mechanisms in the 
US’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
Code: Rising significance and awareness of corruption 
‘But there was no great awareness for compliance issues. This was not something specific to 
Siemens, but it was also not present as an issue in society (Siemens, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘There’s something developing in the awareness of the public (in the Swiss market), and we are 
also contacted by clients to make things transparent’ (Siemens, Senior CM, Nov. 2013).* 
Context of transgression 
Legitimacy 
shock 
Code: Strong emotional shift from pride to consternation 
‘As a company, we had not been in the press with any scandals or crises until that point of time. 
And we were also a tight-knit community in the sense of: Wow, we are a successful company, 
160 years in business. And as a company and an employee of that company experiencing daily 
negative headlines, daily bashing, utterly leads to as an employee being personally affected. It 
also went so far that people reported that it in their families this was the main topic, or that 
friends asked how one could work for such a company and whether one ever knew about that. 
That they always thought that it was so nice that one was working for Siemens. Thus it was real-
ly personal. And a personal crisis for everyone. And I claim that there were extremely many 
people who had no idea about what was happening and there was a huge disappointment in the 
former Chairman and the top management (…) With these accusations and emotions it was clear 
to everyone that profound change must happen’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Company management claimed to be "shocked" by the findings and were eager to support in-
vestigations.’ (RepRisk, Aug. 08, 2007). 
‘The psychology changes - people working for decades for the same company are now a facing 
this new situation’ (Siemens Australia, HR manager, Feb. 2014). 
‘The scandal and the media behavior surely were the main trigger and also what has influenced 
the people in the organization the most … also worldwide. (...) It was a broader system and thus 
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the consternation was a significantly higher one. (...) But the consternation, that is really shaken 
the corporate group as such and that it could also have developed quite differently, this has real-
ly permeated towards every single employee’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
Code: No choice but to radically and instantly react 
‘A crisis helps, and such a scandal helps and we were at the point where we could only change 
the course or sink. And in this first step I think we have taken the necessary measures that (…) 
have helped us, to leave this deep valley of scandal and turn towards a success story. (…) Then 
the process of change started, but not gradually, but this compliance system was implemented 
under brute force. (...) It was just said do it, implement it, do it and everyone now has to do it. 
(...) The scandal, we had no chance. We had Public Prosecution Service in the house and as a 
New York Stock Exchange listed company of course also the SEC, so there was no choice’ 
(Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘”No other way“ Löscher said back then. (...) If 200 Bavarian officers, police with official cars 
are standing on Wittelsbacher Platz and finally enter and confiscate everything, even the com-
puter, then this is not a little something’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘The other thing at the back of Siemens' head is, if they get caught again, would it be a blow 
they can still survive? (...) They don’t have a choice’ (CSR ASEAN, Manager, Mar. 2014). 
External en-
forcement 
pressure 
Code: Pressure of external FCPA monitor 
‘This situation, the pressure of the monitorship no doubt has led us (…) to being forced to estab-
lish a compliance management system. (…) In my judgment however we have also established 
under the monitorship pressure at some positions a tight net of measures, processes and controls. 
(…) But overall, against the background of our history, we are ahead compared to many others. 
So I am not blaming them’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘This was a crisis situation. With the end of the monitorship the situation has changed. (…) But 
we also needed this challenge, the critical point of view’ (Daimler, CM, Nov. 2013).* 
‘There was a kind of agreement between the Group Compliance and Louis Freeh and his moni-
tor team to install a local compliance office (...) We have undergone at Daimler a development 
in the last years facilitated by the monitorship’ (Daimler Greater China, CM, Mar. 2014). 
Code: High scope and intensity of FCPA monitorship 
‘A monitorship is much more intense than usual auditing’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The monitor gave a lot of suggestions in his first report’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘In 2011, the monitor team was 14 days in Australia’ (Daimler Australia, CO, Apr. 2014).* 
‘First and foremost, the monitor has made visits also to China. Some of his visits have also led 
him to the JVs. So they are also aware at that time of their thinking’ (Daimler Greater China, 
CM, Mar. 2014). 
MNC legitimacy strategy 
Decoupling Code: MNC policies not well communicated or enforced 
‘There were formalities and people dealing with compliance of these formalities (…). [I]t was 
simply lacking awareness for theses issue and as a result of that (…) it was also lacking aware-
ness for consequent action when formalities were not met’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
“In the past, compliance was not sufficiently integrated in our business practices, contrary to the 
existing internal regulations.” (Siemens, AR, 2009) 
‘Until the year 2008 we did not do that in a quality that we considered and consider as neces-
sary’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Siemens did not know how many accounts it had’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘Before I joined, we had a colleague who covered Greater China from Germany. She travelled to 
China from time to time’ (Daimler Greater China, (Chinese) CM, Mar. 2014). 
‘So we single handedly started for example in Malaysia, it was a one man show’ (Siemens 
ASEAN, Regional CO, Apr. 2014). 
Isomorphic 
adaptation 
Code: Compliance with external rules 
‘[The FCPA consultant] came out with a number of improvements which we implemented and 
which we reported on very regularly - with the Department of Justice and the SEC’ (ABB Aus-
tralia, IO & Regional counsel, May 2013) 
‘Mercedes went to the Government in the States and said, what we request, is rather than fining 
us this much, fine us this much and let us use this much to change our company. And they put it 
an FBI judge as their Chief Integrity Officer to give oversight’ (TI Malaysia, Apr. 2014). 
Code: Gradual organizational change 
‘The difference between Siemens and Daimler is that Daimler has not changed its leadership 
team. Daimler played it differently’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘We proceed step-by-step, so to speak’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The employees first of all shall be informed and then also qualified to deal with this context’ 
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(Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Perhaps in the first year when the monitor started, the feedback did not get back in a harmo-
nized way from all over the world – politically speaking. (...) You cannot change a culture from 
one day to the other. This takes time.’ (Daimler Australia, CO, Apr. 2014).* 
‘It was a constant amelioration of the CMS. (…) At latest with the DPA also the last employee 
knew the signs of the times’ (Daimler, CM, Nov. 2013).* 
‘Mercedes said it took eight to ten years to really fix the company from top to bottom’ (TI Ma-
laysia, Program manager, Apr. 2014). 
Code: Orientation towards leading business practices 
‘Daimler adopted Siemens‘s Business Partner Tool’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘I would say that the first two to three year we were quite ahead. In the meantime we realize that 
our peers follow (…). The issue controls, the pillar “detect” in many cases is not as developed as 
in our system, but regarding the “prevent” side I would say that there are comparable systems 
among our peers’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
‘For ABB during that time (2010), when I was still there, we were in the start or in the process 
of implementation. (…) On ABB side, they have followed the same track’ (Siemens Philippines, 
Sales manager (formerly at ABB), Apr. 11, 2014). 
Code: Increase the efficiency of new compliance strategy 
‘Here the main task insofar has relocated from coping with the acute situation and the need for 
the establishment of new processes towards the amelioration and sustainable implementation of 
achievements’ (Daimler, compliance manager, Nov.2013).* 
‘The issue improvement in efficiency was one of the focus topics last year within the compli-
ance organization’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
Moral rea-
soning 
Code: What is right and wrong? 'What should I do?' 
“The world has changes and that is good. (…) I think it is fair to first inform and enable them 
(business leaders) to cope with this new context” (Daimler, Senior CO, Nov. 2012). 
(We are not allowed to display the quotes from ABB headquarters.) 
Code: What is the ethical role of a MNC? 
‘We don't want to be seen as culturally insensitive, as a European company trying to preach to 
others’ (ABB Australia, IO Australia & Regional counsel South Asia, May 2013). 
Substantial 
influence 
Code: 'We do more than we have to' 
‘One audit department cannot deliver a big coverage for businesses in 190 countries. The control 
system as such, that we have introduced for our regulations and processes, is the more efficient 
one in that case I think’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘All Siemens payments worldwide are centrally administrated via Munich. This is a voluntary 
step by Siemens, which cannot be found at most of the competitors. (…) Siemens lately volun-
tarily reported to the public prosecutor department three persons that were involved in the Ku-
wait affair. An internal solution, such as dismissal, however would have been sufficient’ (Law-
yer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘We replicated the required global program throughout the Australian organizations despite the 
fact that we haven't had any issues’ (Siemens Australia, Regional CO, Mar. 2013). 
‘I am convinced that Siemens is on top of the list. (…) Siemens has done more than what the 
legislator in America as well as in Germany expects’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘Siemens still is the gold standard in compliance’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2013).* 
‘The entire Collective Action Personal as well as the strategy process are not financed through 
the World Bank or other settlements’ (Siemens, Head of CA, Feb. 2014)* 
‘We have developed a full-blown business partner tool, which I think is a very comprehensive 
tool. I doubt many of these organizations would have such a comprehensive tool’ (Siemens Sin-
gapore, Regional CO ASEAN, Apr. 2014). 
Code: 'We want to make sure everybody else does so too' 
‘[Siemens is] due to the scandal now surely the company with the most developed compliance 
system, which also triggers a high eagerness for knowledge among other companies to learn 
from that and to take over these issues. Not everyone has to invent something new. (…) Under 
the title “Collective Action” one of our goals is to transport our knowledge and experience to-
wards the outside, make it available to others and build alliances with other market participants, 
simply to work together on fair competition’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘In Collective Action Siemens also is a pioneer. A separate person is responsible for the initia-
tive, which underlines the seriousness of the initiative’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The Round Table in Switzerland is mainly pushed by Siemens’ (HTW Chur, Jan. 2014) 
‘It helps to communicate it and make it public’ (Siemens, CO regional entities, Mar. 2014).* 
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